The distinction between underlying and superficial linguistic structure is a staple of modern cognitive psychology. Despite increasingly diverse conceptions of syntactic relations in linguistic theory, the received view in psycholinguistics has remained one in which the entities assigned to underlying relations may assume different surface relations. The present article examines this view in the context of language production and reviews evidence that the disposition to bind animate entities to the surface subject relation is a basic feature of language use, suggesting that mappings from conceptual categories to syntactic relations form a main support of the bridge from concep tion to language. Proceeding on this assumption, the article also evaluates competing accounts of the mapping process in production. The results argue against syntactic relation-changing operations, but favor a division between meaning-and form-related mechanisms.
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One of the more remote components of language production involves the link between the elements of messages and the units and structures of language. A message, or a thought that is destined to be spoken, may be conceived without verbal content. An utterance, which is the encoding of a message in speech, contains words in linguistic structures. The business of language is to provide the means for turning messages into utterances in such a way that the latter convey the former. However, messages themselves seem to provide few clues as to how to proceed. The classic examples involve reference. English allows us to refer to with the word dog, yet the word is by no means inherent in the object itself. Even among Indo-European languages, the basiclevel terms for what English speakers customarily call dogs differ substantially: The French is chien, Spanish perro, Dutch hond, and Russian sobaka.
In this article we are concerned with some of the workings of -the thought-to-language mapping process in the domain of syntax. Here, too, we must draw a distinction between the elements and structures of messages and the elements and structures of utterances. We will mention two of the standard arguments for doing so. First, just as different languages have differ-ent lexicons, they have different structural resources and constraints: French (unlike English) places most adjectives after nouns, Spanish (unlike English) permits the omission of most pronominal subjects, Dutch (unlike English) places the verb at the end of subordinate clauses, and Russian (unlike English) marks syntactic functions with case morphology rather than word order. Yet the ideas and relations that speakers express appear to vary in relatively minor ways. Languages are satisfactorily if not perfectly intertranslatable, and the strongest claims about language-related differences in human conception, those embodied in the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis, seem to be much too strong (Brown, 1976; Carroll & Casagrande, 1958; Heider & Olivier, 1972 ). Second, it appears possible for thought to proceed in the absence of covert verbalization or, more controversially, images of any sort (Humphrey, 1963) , which implies that the stuff of thinking and messages is not the stuff of language. Despite its similarities to the meaning-to-form mapping problem for words, the meaning-to-form mapping problem for syntax is more vexed. Words, or the morphemes that compose them, can be memorized and linked to meanings in a relatively arbitrary fashion (although the phonological and semantic structures of words are themselves not arbitrary). Sentence-, clause-, and phrase-level structures are less facile objects of memorization, both because the number of different structures is unbounded and because their instantiated forms change: The words that appear in them may be drawn from any of the elements of the lexicon, subject to grammatical forrn-class restrictions (restrictions on whether a word must be a noun or verb, for example). So, to ensure that words are arranged in ways that convey speaker-intended meanings, there must be compositional principles that relate structures to meanings. John hit Mary and Mary hit John mean different things, as do John was hit by Maryand Mary was hitby John, manifestly not because of preexisting links between the words John or Mary and the action of hitting or between the sentence subject and the agent of hitting.
The connection to messages must therefore be carried in principles that constrain the organization of structures on the one hand and the composition of messages on the other. Be-
